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OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 6

A CELEBRATION –

10 YEARS OF NUCLEAR FREE LEGISLATION

Proceedings of a joint Centre for Peace Studies/Peace Foundation

Seminar held at the University of Auckland 7 June 1997

June 1997

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INTRODUCTION

June 8 1997 marked the tenth anniversary of the passage into law on June 8 1987 of New Zealand's nuclear free legislation, the Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act. To acknowledge this very important occasion in New Zealand's history, the Centre for Peace Studies and the Foundation for Peace Studies Aotearoa New Zealand organised a joint seminar to review the history of the events that led up to the 1984 Labour nuclear free policy and the subsequent 1987 passage of the legislation, to examine the consequences of the legislation in the areas of foreign policy and defence, and to consider New Zealand's future role as a nuclear free country.

Speakers were invited from the peace movement and from government. Not all those invited were available to speak or felt it appropriate to contribute, but a very comprehensive and representative range of presentations was given by those able to be present. A small audience expressed their considerable satisfaction and appreciation of the seminar.

The papers presented at the seminar are reproduced in this Occasional Paper. They are presented essentially as supplied by the speakers. There has been no attempt to standardise the format over all the papers.

Time was allowed for discussion and comment after each contribution and the proceedings were taped. No summaries of the discussions have been prepared, but the tapes are available if required.

The occasion was further marked by a champagne toast at lunch.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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A CELEBRATION -

10 YEARS OF NUCLEAR FREE LEGISLATION

9 AM TO 3 PM 7 JUNE 1997

SEMINAR PROGRAMME

Nicky Hager	The Peace Movement Origins of the Nuclear Free Legislation
Richard Northey	What the 1984-90 Labour Government Thought it was Doing
Bob White	The Nuclear Free Policy, the Legislation, and Defence
Christine Bogle	An Overview of Current Nuclear Disarmament Initiatives and New Zealand's Role
Helen Clark	Looking to the Future

THE SPEAKERS

Nicky Hager

His involvement with the peace movement began in 1976 so spans 21 years and includes a number of campaigns to stop nuclear warship visits which contributed to New Zealand becoming nuclear free. He travelled extensively around the country for the peace movement during the 1980s spending time keeping groups and individuals up-to-date with developments and working to achieve a ban on nuclear warship visits. Nicky works as a peace researcher. His most recently published work is his book entitled 'Secret Power'.

Richard Northey

Richard was an Auckland Labour Government MP between 1984-90 and an opposition MP from 1993-96. During his term as a government MP he was a member of Labour's Foreign Affairs and Defence Caucus Committee and its chair from 1993-96. He also sat on the Disarmament Select Committee from 1984-85. He was President of the NZ Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament from 1970-83 and of Auckland Youth CND from 1963-68. During his involvement with CND he authored a number of pamphlets including `The Case Against French Nuclear Tests' and 'ANZUS: Nuclear Umbrella or Nuclear Magnet'. Richard attended the first UN Special Session on Disainiament as this country's NGO representative in 1978 and is currently a member of the Peace Foundation's Council.

Dr. Bob White

Co-founder of the Auckland University Centre for Peace Studies in 1988 and its Director since that time, he has been involved in peace research since the late 1970s. He was also one of the founders in 1983 of Scientists Against Nuclear Arms. He has studied US naval strategies and the neither confirm nor deny policy, and their relation to New Zealand's nuclear free policy extensively. He has published a number of works in this area, and is currently producing a series of working papers relating to the nuclear policy and the New Zealand nuclear free legislation.

Christine Bogle

Christine is a senior policy officer in the International Security and Arms Control Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Her particular focus is on nuclear issues, including the CTBT, the NPT, and the IAEA. She was Deputy Head of Mission at the New Zealand Embassy in Rome prior to her present appointment. She has worked in the Economics, Development Cooperation, South Pacific and Public Affairs Divisions in the Ministry, and in the early 1980s was appointed to the New Zealand Embassy in Lima, Peru.

The Right Hon. Helen Clark

Helen Clark is widely known for her long record of involvement in the Labour Party and with Labour's anti-nuclear stance and policy. She has held office at every level of the Party. She was elected to Parliament in 1981, and has been extensively involved with matters relating to defence and foreign policy on select committees and in other capacities. She has held the positions of Minister of Conservation, Housing, Health, and Labour, and became Deputy Prime Minister in 1989. She became the Leader of the Opposition in December 1993. Helen has long championed Labour's anti-nuclear stance, and the strict enforcement of Labour's 1984 anti-nuclear policy and the subsequent legislation.

The Peace Movement Origins of the Nuclear Free Legislation

N Hager, Researcher

73 Grafton Road, Roseneath, Wellington

The campaign that culminated in New Zealand's nuclear free legislation is an outstanding example of public action leading to political change. Many, many thousands of people from all sectors of society participated in the nuclear free New Zealand campaign over a 15 year period. Over that time, nuclear free ideas went from being regarded as fringe to being utterly mainstream. This was a huge achievement for the literally hundreds of people -- in and outside peace groups all over the country -- who at some stage were organisers of parts of the campaign.

The nuclear free policy was achieved despite the concerted opposition of the local foreign affairs and defence elite and years of pressure from foreign powers. Despite this opposition, the nuclear free campaign was more successful than any of the organisers could ever have foreseen and, I believe, had a significant effect internationally in helping to end the superpower nuclear confrontation.

So it is great that this meeting is being held today to acknowledge this remarkable campaign and celebrate the achievements. As I read through old publications and notes in preparation for this talk, I came across the names of dozens and dozens of people who played leading roles in the campaign, who deserve thanks for all the work they did.

Most of these people of course have moved on to other things, which has unfortunately left public discussion of the nuclear free policy today mostly to the foreign affairs and defence old guard who, more often than not, are disparaging about it. From their paid positions within the bureaucracy and universities, many have continued to put the policy down as idealistic, naive and against the country's interests. This makes it important that other people keep telling the real story.

It is also worth remembering this campaign because it serves as an inspiring model of public campaigning and a reminder of the power of that campaigning. It is an example needed today. Much like today, New Zealand in the late 1970s and early 1980s felt extremely undemocratic under the Muldoon-Birch government. Yet those were the years when the nuclear free New Zealand campaign was building up momentum, organising at a grassroots level despite the immovability of the government.

1945 - 1975

Opposition to nuclear weapons began in New Zealand soon after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Shortly after the war ended Lincoln Efford of the National Peace Council compared the atomic bomb with concentration camps. He wrote: What hypocrisy it is for us who have burnt hundreds of thousands of men, women and children to death to achieve our victory to bring to trial and punishment the losers for their atrocities. The first Hiroshima Day march was held in Christchurch in 1947.

This movement grew through the 1950s and early 1960s. It is easy to see why. In the early 1950s Britain started testing atomic weapons in Australia and the US tested its first nuclear weapons at Bikini Atoll. The US publicly threatened China with atomic weapons several times in the 1950s during and after the Korean War and the whole world held its breath during open nuclear threats in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963.

Following the formation of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in February 1958, new anti-nuclear groups met in New Zealand during 1959 and 1960, eventually becoming New Zealand CND.

The idea of Nuclear Free Zones was already being discussed at that time. New Zealand CND began a campaign for a Southern Hemisphere Nuclear Free Zone (extending the 1959 Antarctic Treaty's nuclear free zone northwards to include the whole southern hemisphere). The campaign slogan was No Bombs South of the Line. CND organised a petition on this proposal in 1963 that got 80,000 signatures, making it the biggest petition since the women's franchise in 1893. (You may remember that this same southern hemisphere idea was being promoted again just last year, by none other than Jim Bolger.)

The idea of a New Zealand nuclear free zone was also first raised at that time. Larry Ross, an immigrant from Canada, presented his New Zealand nuclear free zone plan to a conference in 1964, arguing that it could be a model and precedent for other countries and regions.

But soon after the anti-nuclear movement began to shrink. Much of the campaign had focussed on nuclear testing and in October 1963 the Partial Test Ban Treaty banned atmospheric nuclear tests, resulting in some loss of impetus (France and China did not sign). More important, though, the Vietnam War had begun. It largely obscured nuclear issues for almost a decade.

1975 - 1984

The campaign that led directly to the nuclear free legislation began in *1975,* when several factors came together to direct peace movement attention onto United States nuclear warship visits. The first of these was that nuclear weapons were back strongly in New Zealanders' minds after protest yachts sailed to Moruroa in 1972, 1973 and 1974; the second that US warship visits had become a regular object of protest during the Vietnam War as symbols of US militarism; and the third that New Zealand was just at the end of a national environmental debate over whether the country should have nuclear power stations - having just succeeded in stopping nuclear power plants on land, they were about to be bobbing around in the harbours.

Shortly after he was elected in late 1975, Prime Minister Rob Muldoon announced that New Zealand ports would be opened to US nuclear-powered warships. To bar them from visiting our harbours, he said, is incompatible with membership of ANZUS and puts impossible restraints on our allies. The first of them, the cruiser USS Truxtun, arrived in Wellington in August 1976 followed by the cruiser USS Long Beach to Auckland six weeks later. In Wellington there was a straggly protest beside the wharves in wet southerly storm, but in Auckland over 100 protest boats blocked the harbour, twice bringing the Long Beach to a halt.

A wise American military strategist looking back would be bound to wish that these nuclear-powered warships had never been sent to New Zealand. They quickly became a powerful focus of anti-nuclear campaigning. They not only brought nuclear weapons into New Zealand in an ugly, blatant way, but for the public they were a physical manifestation of the whole nuclear arms race which otherwise was a worrying but faraway thing.

The Peace Squadrons of small boats that tried to block the warship visits were likewise a powerful symbol. They were the perfect symbol of motivated individuals acting to stop something they believe to be wrong. They also attracted a large amount of news media attention, ensuring that lots of controversy surrounded every visit. Although only there were only eight visits by nuclear-powered warships between 1976 and 1984, the protests during these visits gave a focus to all the other nuclear campaigning between the visits.

In the late 1970s the nuclear free campaign was going well, but it was not until the early 1980s that it really took off, multiplying in strength. There were internal and external reasons for this. At the end of 1980 Ronald Reagan had become US president and Cold War confrontation worsened as new US nuclear weapons were stationed in Europe. The possibility of nuclear war felt very real. At the same time, in New Zealand the 1981 Springbok Tour protests brought large numbers of new people into movement politics, many of whom joined the nuclear free campaign. Similarly, the example of women's protests against cruise missiles at Greenham Common encouraged many new women to join peace groups and take leading roles. The 1983 tour of New Zealand by Helen Caldicott had the same effect on both men and women. And throughout this period, in our region, campaigners in New Zealand were working with and gaining inspiration from campaigners in many other South Pacific and northern Pacific countries and territories as members of the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement.

The other major influence, I think, was the nationwide campaign co-ordinated by Larry Ross and others to have individual towns and cities declare themselves nuclear free. I remember thinking this was quite a weak idea at first. But it turned out to be a powerful organising strategy because, despite there being an unsympathetic National Government, it allowed there to be organising and public debate about nuclear weapons and small victories \in every part of the country. This simple campaign idea built up a lot of the strength of the peace movement at that time by providing roles for hundreds of people to be active in their own areas building political pressure for a nuclear free New Zealand.

By 1983 the campaign was at a peak. When the USS Texas visited Wellington that year there were strikes and stopworks by unions, protest church services by Christians for Peace, Women for Peace protests (including a wonderful leaflet headed Cross Your Legs For Peace), School Children Against Nuclear Arms (SCANA) protests; and the huge march through the city included a parade of giant grotesque models made by local artists and speakers at the end including a representative from Young Nationals. Many public figures were taking a stand. The extent and breadth of the public activism suddenly made the movement feel unstoppable. A few months later National MP Marilyn Waring threatened to cross the floor of Parliament to support a Labour Party nuclear free bill, a move which Muldoon used in part to justify calling an early election.

An important element of the campaign at this time was the effectiveness of research and public education by the peace movement. All the warships visited under the policy of neither confirming nor denying whether there were nuclear weapons on board. In many countries this uncertainty served to defuse public concern. But in New Zealand this policy ended up working against the US Navy.

Aided by researchers like Owen Wilkes, the peace movement used overseas publications to alert the public to the nuclear weapons systems on each ship and their role in nuclear weapon strategies. Issues such as which warships were nuclear capable, and the credibility the peace movement had with the public on these matters, came to be crucial to the campaign after the Labour Government was elected.

The success of the nuclear free campaign also had a lot to do with timing, with the election to government of a political party with nuclear free policies just when the public movement was strongest. If Labour had lost that election the movement may well have started to wane, and without the strength of public feeling it is very unlikely that the new government would have withstood the overseas pressure to backdown on the policy.

The Buchanan decision

Labour was elected in July 1984, after an election campaign in which nuclear warships were a major issue. Its election policy included the prohibition of nuclear armed and/or

powered warships and/or craft in New Zealand waters and said Labour will legislate to make New Zealand and its territorial waters nuclear free.

However when Labour was elected it was not assumed that the nuclear ship ban was a certainty. Just the year before a Labour Party had been elected in Australia with similar nuclear free policies only to have Labour Prime Minister Bob Hawke reverse the policy shortly after gaining office. It was known that sooner or later the US Navy would request a warship visit and many people feared that David Lange would 'do a Hawke'.

In December 1984 it was announced that a US request for a warship visit was imminent. The Coalition Against Nuclear Warships, which I was part of, published a list of all nuclear capable vessels in the US Navy, declaring that if the government allowed one of them to visit it would be met by huge protests. The peace movement fear was that the US would try to get a visit by a nuclear capable warship (that is, one equipped to launch nuclear weapons) which it had persuaded our government in private was not currently nuclear armed. Once one such ambiguous ship had been allowed in, there would be nothing to stop all the other ambiguous nuclear capable ship from coming and the nuclear free policy would have been rendered worthless.

The peace movement suspicions were justified. New Zealand foreign affairs, intelligence and military advisers had been secretly co-operating with the US and Australia on precisely this plan and were trying to manoeuvre the Labour Government towards accepting it. Two reports were prepared by the External Intelligence Bureau which concluded, conveniently, that senior New Zealand military officer would be able to judge accurately the probability that a given warship was or was not nuclear armed. At the same time the Chief of Defence Staff -- ie. the senior NZ military staff -- had travelled to the US to arrange a not very likely, but still possibly nuclear armed, warship with which to challenge the nuclear free policy.

Bob White recently obtained a fascinating collection of the original foreign affairs documents from this period, which clearly show the way that the supposed public servants carefully tried to undermine the nuclear free policy. These papers include a proposed chronology of events, prepared by Foreign Affairs in December 1984 to explain how they saw events unfolding, which contained such items as Speech by Prime Minister including a section on ANZUS and ship visits, and US lodges a request for visit by conventionally powered combatant ship (Buchanan) and, of course, the Labour Government agreeing to the visit. The papers show that Foreign Affairs officials urged the government to accept the Buchanan but carefully didn't give the Ministers any information upon which to judge the acceptability of the US warship -such as the two EIB reports written three months before -- until the last few days when they had little time to assess the advice. They had even drafted a ghastly slippery press release for Lange announcing that the visit had been approved (the press release sounds like its been written by the State Department and manages to avoid actually saying that there are or are not nuclear weapons on board). Bob is publishing these papers shortly. They provide a valuable case study of how some officials try to manipulate the policies of governments.

As we know, that press release never got used, but the fight towards the end was intense. In the last week of January 1985, Lange was out of the country and Acting Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer put out another slippery press release confirming that the government had received a US government request for a warship visit but saying that it was expected that no decision would be made for several weeks (in fact, the Cabinet was due to consider the request a week later).The old deny-a-decision's-about-to-be-made-until-it's-too-late-for public-input trick. The next day he put out another release saying that the government would decide whether the proposed ship was nuclear armed based on the expertise of our own military and intelligence advisers. I remember very clearly that it was this press release that rang the alarm bells for me. It sounded totally as though he was preparing the ground for letting in an ambiguous nuclear

capable warship. All through the peace movement, and also in the Labour Party, frantic action began. At the beginning of that last week before the decision, for example, Maire Leadbeater of CND here in Auckland was asked by a journalist what action they were planning. Without time to consult widely, she said that there would be a march down Queen Street two days later. It shows how strong public feeling was that, with only news media publicity for the march, between 15,000 and 20,000 people turned out. The central slogan in the march showed that people were well aware of how the nuclear free policy could be compromised. It said: If in doubt, keep it out -- meaning that no warship that could possibly be nuclear armed should be accepted.

All the Labour MPs were being lobbied strongly, there were emergency meetings in the Labour Party and intense debate and speculation was going on in the news media. Perhaps most important, all over the country peace groups and other concerned organisations and individuals were busy encouraging supporters to contact the government urgently about the decision. It was the most amazing, effective networking I have ever seen. By the following Monday, when Lange arrived back in New Zealand for the crucial Cabinet meeting, thousands and thousands and thousands of letters and telegrams were waiting for him.

I am still amazed that the public won. It is a rare event for public opinion to prevail and the officials not to get their way; all the more so over something that mattered so much to the allies. At the beginning of February Lange announced that they had refused the Buchanan visit. The main Evening Post front page headline in Wellington that day was just a big NO - everyone knew what it meant.

Lange explained that unless his government could give an absolute assurance to the public that a nuclear capable ship was not nuclear armed it would not be allowed into New Zealand. They could not, and so the request had been declined. All hell broke loose. Criticism and praise poured in from around the world. The US reacted angrily, cutting many of the visible military links between the two countries -- which of course was icing on the cake for the peace movement. I personally think that a lot of the US government anger was because they had been listening to the scheming New Zealand officials and believed that they would be successful in undermining the policy.

Lange, after giving the officials the benefit of the doubt for months that they could find a solution that was not a sell out, now defended the policy with vigour. He was given news of the US military retaliation as he passed through the US on the way to the famous Oxford Union debate, which he won arguing that nuclear weapons are immoral. He had gone to the debate against the advice of the foreign affairs officials, and totally infuriated the US and British governments by his rejection of nuclear deterrence.

Many people in the peace movement, including me, initially feared that the allies' threats and retaliation and the outraged reaction from ANZUS supporters in New Zealand would rattle the public and scare people off the new nuclear free policy. In fact the opposite happened. It turned out that many ordinary New Zealanders who had never supported the nuclear free campaign reacted strongly to seeing other countries bullying New Zealand. Opinion polls showed support for the policy getting stronger. In response to a series of public requests, the Coalition Against Nuclear Warships organised the only large pro-government demonstration I have ever been involved in, with lots of people turning up to Parliament to support the government's stand.

Through the rest of 1985 there was very not much for the peace movement to do. David Lange eloquently defended the policy and it became clear that the United States was not aiming its reactions at a New Zealand audience, but at other countries that it wanted to put off the idea of following New Zealand's example. They did not seem to care or even particularly notice that their heavying was being counterproductive in New Zealand.

Nuclear free legislation

As soon as the Labour Government had said no to the Buchanan, there was no turning back. All the officials' carefully laid plans were swept aside and the nuclear free policy was securely in place. However this still left the other half of Labour's election plans, which was to legislate to make New Zealand nuclear free. For over a year what was called the ANZUS crisis took everyones' attention. But then some people started raising the question of legislation.

I can remember expressing the view that the nuclear free policy was so firmly established that there was no great need for legislation. But other people pushed Labour to honour the election promise which was very lucky, because the existence of the legislation turned out to be an important block to people within National Party pushing to change the policy after they became government in 1990.

Having failed to undermine the policy by a visit by a nuclear capable warship, the United States and British governments shifted their lobbying to trying to stop the policy being, as they saw it, set in concrete with legislation. There was private pressure applied on the Labour Government at this time by these governments to scrap the legislation. This was the new line in the sand that they said New Zealand must not cross. This view was also pushed by the local foreign affairs officials, who on this and many other issues were arguing that Labour had done enough damage to important relationships already and should do nothing to antagonise these countries further. (I still feel indignant that these New Zealand public servants identified so much with the perspective of other countries rather than New Zealanders.)

In late September 1986 Lange appeared to be yielding to pressure. He announced that the Government did not regard passing of the nuclear free legislation as a priority because the policy was already in place. In response peace movement campaigning increased urging for legislation. But by early 1987 Roger Douglas' policies meant that Labour was falling in the polls and in risk of losing that year's general election. I suspect that this, more than anything, made Labour decide to proceed with legislation to remind voters of their most popular action as government. The legislation was eventually passed shortly before the election.

The bill first introduced to Parliament had various weaknesses from a peace movement point of view, but was still strong enough to infuriate the US and British governments. The peace movement ran a large campaign encouraging people to write submissions supporting the legislation and strengthening of it. At the same time the US ambassador and British VIP visitors like a Baroness Young and Sir John Fieldhouse were lobbying strenuously in private for crucial changes to be made to the legislation. The clauses relating to nuclear armed and powered ships and New Zealand co-operation with nuclear components of foreign militaries all had to be changed, they argued.

In the end the public and foreign pressures effectively cancelled each other out and the legislation was passed with few changes. There was a party of peace movement people, Labour Party activists and MPs that evening in Parliament Grounds with champagne and balloons.

The other significant peace movement action that year was campaigning against National during the 1987 election campaign. We knew that if National was elected the nuclear free legislation would be repealed. There were banners on the National Party headquarters, leaflets in letter boxes in marginal electorates, posters, meetings and so on. Some of Jim Bolger's large rallies were spoilt by a succession of peace movement people heckling, unfurling banners and being dragged out. By election day Jim Bolger would have been in no doubt that the nuclear free issue had damaged his party's support.

Labour was re-elected and, with the nuclear free policy obviously secure for another three years, peace groups moved onto other work such as the 1988-89 ANZAC frigate campaign.

But, as election year approached again, news began to come out that there were rumblings within the National Party about its policy on the nuclear free legislation. This seemed extraordinary: many of the National MPs had aggressively opposed this loony anti-nuclear stuff for years.

But National is supremely pragmatic about the importance of being in power. In March 1990, at the start of the election year, Jim Bolger suddenly announced that his party had reviewed its position and now totally supported the nuclear free legislation. He could argue reasonably convincingly that the world situation had changed: the Berlin Wall had fallen only a few months before. But nobody doubted that the main thing that won the vote in the National caucus was that the party did not want to go into another election with pro-nuclear policies.

Having adopted Labour's most popular policy, National won easily. New Zealand now had a bi-partisan nuclear free policy. It had never been so secure.

There was one last attempt to overturn the nuclear free legislation. A faction within National, led by Don McKinnon and backed by the pro-ANZUS officials, still strongly disliked the policy and in late 1991 made their move. Since opinion polls showed that the public felt more strongly about nuclear armed than nuclear powered warships, they aimed their wedge at this part of the legislation. A review was announced into the safety of nuclear powered ships and a four person review team was chosen carefully to give the answers these people wanted. (There was even talk at this time that the US government was backing McKinnon as replacement for Bolger as Prime Minister.)

There was another busy year of peace movement campaigning, during which a remarkably broad cross section of New Zealanders made it known that they opposed any changes to the legislation, so that even before the review was handed to the government it was clear that the attempt had failed. Jim Bolger could see that public opinion was still strongly behind the nuclear free policy and he assured the public on the day the report was released in early 1993 that there were no plans to change the legislation.

That brings us to the present. The foreign affairs officials are still pushing to get New Zealand back into something like ANZUS, and the new Minister of Defence is claiming that the public is starting to rethink the extreme anti-nuclear policies, but I believe that no government will dare to change the nuclear free legislation at least for many years to come. Although David Lange and even at times Jim Bolger have been the ones fronting the policy internationally for the country, the reason that the policy is still there, and still being an irritant for nuclear disarmament, is because the public campaign has been so successful that governments have had no option but to embrace it.

The nuclear free policy's detractors have always argued that it has made no practical difference at all to nuclear disarmament; that there was not a single nuclear weapon less in the world as a result of it. But the obvious reply is: if the policy had been ineffectual, why did New Zealand's former nuclear-armed allies take such violent exception to it? I believe that the widely publicised example of a small, western-leaning country breaking ranks and condemning nuclear weapons was very significant in helping to end the Cold War. It is hard to plot the influence and effects of ideas, but New Zealand's nuclear free stand was talked of continually in discussions about nuclear weapons during the crucial years in the late 1980s when the Cold War was thawing and brought to an end.

I have deliberately emphasised the role of pro-ANZUS officials in this talk because I think their role needs to be exposed and discussed. Manipulation, control of information

and active exclusion of the public from decision-making are still business as usual in Wellington on many important foreign policy and military issues. Throughout the years of nuclear free campaigning I always used to say that our main opposition was not some group like the RSA or National Party, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs -- public servants paid by New Zealanders supposedly to represent their aspirations and interests around the world. This was not an idle criticism -- over and over I was crossing tracks with bureaucrats who were intent on getting their Minister to understand how small New Zealand is in the world and how much it is in our interests to buy favour by doing whatever the big powers expect of us.

Also, we should never forget the ugly spectacle of New Zealand's big friends and allies' total indignation that New Zealanders might choose to have a different opinion from them. The heavyness, condescension and contempt poured on New Zealand for a democratically decided policy should serve as a reminder of how utterly un-equal relationships like ANZUS always were and will be.

But as I said at the start, the main people who should be remembered today are the hundreds and thousands of New Zealanders who organised and took part in the historic campaign that succeeded, despite these people, to establish a national policy of opposition to nuclear weapons. I hope that one day there will be an equivalent of Elsie Locke's book Peace People, which is a history of peace movement work up until 1975, to record the work of all the people were part of this campaign (I'm not offering to write it).

There is some foolish talk at the moment about making ANZAC Day New Zealand's national day. The idea is that somehow the pointless, wasteful deaths of large numbers of New Zealanders under British commanders on a beach in Turkey symbolises New Zealand's birth as a nation. I think Gallipoli, the ANZAC soldiers (and the ANZAC frigates aptly named after them) are actually symbols of the old alliance obedience mentality that New Zealand needs to leave behind. A much better candidate for a national day would be June 8, tomorrow, the anniversary of the nuclear free legislation. I think the legislation is as a strong symbol of New Zealanders' identity and national independence. Of course I don't actually think it will replace ANZAC Day, but it should.

Address to Centre for Peace Studies and Peace Foundation Seminar

A Celebration - 10 Years of Nuclear Free Legislation - Saturday June 7

What the 1984-90 Labour Government Thought it was Doing

Richard Northey, Member, Foreign Affairs Caucus Committee 1984-90

When Labour was comfortably elected to power on July 14 1984, the issue of a nuclear free New Zealand was a vitally important one both for the Labour Party and for much of the electorate. Many of its MPs such as Leader David Lange, since he viewed the awful outcome of the high altitude test in 1962, and Jonathan Hunt had been anti-nuclear activists since the early 1960s and Michael Bassett and I were also former Presidents of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Also, the outgoing Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, alleged that the whole reason for the snap election was the determination of one National MP, Marilyn Waring, no longer to support the Government on nuclear legislation, such as Richard Prebble' s Nuclear Free New Zealand Bill. Muldoon then regarded the issue as so central he had made it a confidence issue in effect.

Both a significant section of New Zealand public opinion and the Labour Party had long given real importance to nuclear issues. After public pressure, Walter Nash's Labour Government ceased naval collaboration with British thermonuclear tests at Christmas Island in the Pacific, and thenceforth they and all subsequent New Zealand Governments have opposed all nuclear testing. Nash successfully took the lead in establishing the world's first nuclear weapon free zone in Antarctica in 1959. In the 1963 election Labour was unsuccessful but campaigned for a nuclear weapon free southern hemisphere in response to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament's huge 80,000 signature petition - at that time third in size only to the Citizen's All Black Tour petition in 1960, and the Women's Suffrage petition of 1893.

In 1972 Labour supported, and sent its MP Matiu Rata on, CND and Peace Media protest voyages into the French atmospheric nuclear testing zone at Muroroa. As in 1984, nuclear issues were prominent in Labour's successful 1972 election campaign. Labour promised to send a frigate into the French testing zone and to take the French Government to the International Court of Justice. Labour carried out these promises and succeeded at least in driving the French Tests underground. It also took the lead in getting support in principle for a South Pacific nuclear free zone unanimously from the South Pacific Forum in July 1975 and overwhelmingly from the UN General Assembly that November. This came days after Labour was swept from office by Muldoon. In the light of American and British Government opposition to the proposal it was not proceeded with by the National Government.

In the 1960s a number of American warships visited New Zealand ports to provide rest and recreation for their crew from the Vietnam War. Protests centred on their participation in that war more than on their nuclear capability, although that was the focus of CND's protests. In early 1975 the US Government sought a change in the Labour Government's policy of banning the entry of nuclear propelled vessels so that all of their fleet could visit here. The

sweetener was a change in US policy to fully indemnify the hosts for the costs of any nuclear accident. The Labour Government ignored the request. It was renewed with the change of Government and Muldoon immediately agreed to it. This drew immediate and widespread public opposition. All visits were invariably accompanied by large demonstrations, both on the water co-ordinated by the Peace Squadron and on shore co-ordinated by a broad Coalition Against Nuclear Warships which I chaired in Auckland. In the light of the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island accidents and a Commission of Inquiry coming out against nuclear power for New Zealand, opinion polls showed a clear majority against nuclear-powered vessels, with opinion more evenly divided on those which were merely carrying nuclear weapons. Nevertheless Labour from 1976 committed itself to opposing both.

Both the National Government and the Labour Opposition were subjected to immense American Government pressure on the nuclear warships visit issue. The Americans were determined that it was central to the effectiveness of their anti-communist alliance that all of their military forces be able to visit all their allies at any time, while neither confirming nor denying whether they were carrying nuclear weapons. The National Government stood up to the Americans on a nuclear test ban but on no significant other nuclear issues, in order to preserve the American alliance and security guarantee to New Zealand. Labour, and particularly David Lange, largely wanted the American alliance but rejected nuclear deterrence and security guarantees as immoral and dangerous for world survival. Nevertheless he sought twice to cut opposition to nuclear propelled vessels, where they were proved safe, from Labour's policy, once shortly after his election to the leadership in early 1983, and again after a US visit to Vice-President Bush and others in 1984. In both cases Labour Party members vigorously rejected the suggestion, partly because of the environmental danger but more because most of us saw the nuclear power industry, particularly naval nuclear power plants, were inextricably and immorally linked with nuclear weapons and their deployment.

The majority of Labour activists demonstrated by Conference resolutions that they wanted a policy commitment to withdraw from ANZUS while it remained a nuclear alliance However most Labour MPs and the majority of the New Zealand public felt they needed the security of the US Alliance. So former leader and then foreign affairs spokesperson Bill Rowling succeeded in drawing up and gaining support for an official 1984 election policy "to renegotiate the terms of our association with Australia and the United States" while encompassing "New Zealand's unconditional anti-nuclear stance".

Although Labour had campaigned for a nuclear free New Zealand in 1978 and 1981 the peace movement and the Labour women's section, led by Margaret Wilson and Helen Clark, urged that the 1984 manifesto include a commitment to enforce that status by legislation. This was to be done to give it more force and more permanence, with a future National Government requiring public submissions and Parliamentary approval before it could reverse the policy. The proposed anti-nuclear legislation was initially opposed by Party President Jim Anderton and some MPs as unnecessary, but it got overwhelming endorsement from the Conference and Policy Council and was a key feature of our manifesto.

In July 1984, at the time of the election, the majority of the New Zealand public held a range of opinions on nuclear issues which were ultimately to prove contradictory. The peace and

women's movements had succeeded brilliantly in persuading the majority of New Zealanders to oppose nuclear power and nuclear weapons in all their aspects, including their testing, presence in New Zealand, or possible use. The majority believed that nuclear war was probable and that it would have the intolerable consequence of a nuclear winter and radioactive desertification that would mean the end of human civilisation. This was demonstrated by the majority of people already living in areas which their local authorities had declared nuclear free. On the other hand the majority of people also feared a communist world takeover or an invasion of New Zealand from Asia and strongly supported continued active participation in the ANZUS alliance. Only occasionally was the hard question asked as to whether occasional nuclear weapon carrying warship visits would be accepted if that was the only way to retain ANZUS, and then very evenly divided opinions would be revealed.

One of the first actions of the new Labour Government was to declare that visits by nuclear powered vessels and by warships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons were banned. Although most Labour MPs strongly supported the policy, its continued implementation and translation into legislation required considerable fortitude in the face of confused and divided attitudes from many of the public, and continuing opposition and pressure from its defence and foreign affairs advisers and from the American, British and Australian Governments, the last of which had pledged a similar nuclear free policy but had given in to similar pressure.

David Lange had suggested a 6 months period of grace while an accommodation was sought in a form which was consistent with our policy. Then permission for the visit of a particular ship was to be sought. However, the Americans refused any solution that would give any clues towards confirming or denying that a vessel carried nuclear weapons. As Foreign Minister, David Lange carried out most of these discussions, sometimes involving Geoffrey Palmer and Mike Moore. As far as David Lange and the caucus was concerned the policy was quite clear, it was just that he and most MPs preferred to keep an operational ANZUS as well. Bob Tizard told me, in the course of my research for this speech, that his only involvement was, as Energy Minister, to confirm that we would not need nuclear power for the foreseeable future.

While David Lange was on a long planned official visit cum holiday to the Tokelaus in January 1985, the Americans requested and leaked that they wanted a visit by the USS Buchanan. It was reputedly to be coming directly from theoretically (but we knew not always actually) nuclear free Japan, it was elderly and conventionally powered, and the only nuclear weapons it was capable of carrying were ASROC anti-submarine missile depth charges which were sometimes nuclear armed. Most voices in the peace movement urged its immediate rejection because clearly it was nuclear capable. However Labour's policy was different - the Government had to be satisfied no nuclear weapons were aboard at the time of the visit in order to reject it. I was invited to speak at a protest rally in Aotea Square that drew 15,000 very concerned Aucklanders. I was eager to speak, and David Lange agreed, on the basis of "If in doubt - Keep it out". Labour's backbench women MPs, Helen Clark, Fran Wilde, Judy Keall, Annette King and Anne Collins worked with the peace movement to ensure the bombardment of their colleagues with the same message from thousands of constituents. The Government's advisers recommended Acting PM Geoffrey Palmer to let the warship in. He agonised over their evidence of the absence of nuclear weapons, decided this

was not certain, and recommended against the visit. David Lange agreed on his return and recommended to caucus accordingly. Only Trevor De Cleene spoke against the recommendation and it was carried with some passionate supporting statements. On the advice of Nicky Hager we instead confidentially sought a visit from the more modern but always conventionally armed Oliver Hazard Perry class vessel. This information was leaked from somewhere, probably an Australian official, the Americans publicly declined the counter offer, and then David Lange officially declined the Buchanan visit.

The United States responded with sanctions considerably more severe than they had indicated when we were developing the policy in 1983 and '84 and appreciably more severe than was promised in late 1984. There was a ban on military exercises, training and most forms of cooperation, a stop to the provision of processed intelligence information (although unprocessed information continued to be interchanged more readily than I wished) and a ban on meetings with anyone above assistant secretary level was imposed. The last was more severe than that imposed on China, Iraq, or Zaire and similar to that on Nicaragua, Vietnam and North Korea. However the Americans kept their promise that there would be no trade sanctions. In fact as a result of the women's peace movement girlcott asking supportive Americans to buy New Zealand goods our sales in the US increased appreciably.

There was some confusion about David Lange's oft repeated statement that our anti-nuclear policy was -not for export". In part this reflected a desire to step carefully in the diplomatic minefield and not to provoke our erstwhile allies, now friends, by seeming to encourage every country in Western Europe, but none in the East, to expel all nuclear weapons from their soil. Nevertheless he eagerly accepted overseas invitations to explain our non nuclear position, that it was the duty of responsible governments to look for means of securing the peace and safety of their people in ways which did not involve reliance on the dangerous and immoral nuclear weapons, and urge them to take active disarmament initiatives appropriate to their situation. The best remembered and inspirational example was the 1985 Oxford Union debate where he successfully argued that nuclear weapons are morally indefensible. He went on to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and in a measured statement concluded, "We do not say to any country in the world, do as New Zealand does. We say when the opportunity arises in any country to pursue a serious and balanced measure of arms control, then that country has a duty to all of us to undertake that measure".

Nevertheless New Zealand's actions and staunchness enormously inspired the Australian peace movement. Helen Clark, Fran Wilde and I were invited to speak at the 1985 Palm Sunday Peace Rallies in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. We were enjoined, before we left, not to criticise the Australian Labor Government for reneging on adopting our policy. However, simply by explaining the compelling reasons why New Zealand adopted the antinuclear policy we were all cheered continuously to the echo by crowds of over a hundred thousand each. In spite of this strength of public feeling, Parliamentary support for Australia to follow suit never again extended beyond Labor's Left faction, some Democrats, the Greens and the new Nuclear Disarmament Party.

Immediately after the election the Labour Government took up again the proposal for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, at the August 1984 South Pacific Forum in Tuvalu. The zone

proposal banned nuclear tests, nuclear weapon bases, and nuclear waste dumping throughout what became the world's largest nuclear weapon free zone. It did not ban passage through the high seas or international airspace because that would be contrary to international law. To the disappointment of Vanuatu, it did not ban nuclear port visits because of the opposition of Australia, Britain and the US. It was signed at the Rarotonga Forum meeting on Hiroshima Day 1985. To come into full force the Treaty of Rarotonga needed the signature and ratification of its protocols by the nuclear powers, but although the Soviet Union and eventually China did so, Britain and the United States preferred to show solidarity with the French and their nuclear testing rather than with Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific nations. They did not ratify the Treaty until the French were pressured into cutting short their last series of nuclear tests in 1996.

The Rainbow Warrior, that I was going to join on its protest voyage to the French nuclear testing zone, was sunk in Auckland Harbour in August 1985. At the caucus the next morning David Lange said he believed it was done by agents of a nuclear power, but not the Americans. So it proved, but our allies neither warned us of, nor condemned, this murderous terrorist act in any way. Greenpeace International were amazed to gain the full co-operation from a supportive government and an efficient police force and face obstacles and high port charges from a Tory controlled Harbour Board. The French Government wouldn't own up, then didn't apologise, and then applied trade sanctions and sought reductions on our trade entry into the EU. All our erstwhile friends in the diplomatic community didn't condemn these actions as an outrage but saw them simply as expressions of a dispute between two countries that had to be negotiated and compromised through. With our economy and employment levels threatened and the international community urging a negotiated settlement Cabinet in the end agreed to this. Peres de Cuellar put his imprimatur on it and we secured a French apology, compensation for Greenpeace and the family of the murdered crew member, and a massive backlash from public opinion.

With all these signs of support and encouragement from its former allies, the Labour government decided it had nothing to lose, and the world's people potentially had a future to gain, if we went ahead with our anti-nuclear legislation. It was introduced in December 1985. The bill not only gave our nuclear propelled and armed warship and aircraft ban legal and permanent backing, it also banned nuclear power stations, nuclear waste dumping, and any collaboration with nuclear weapons by New Zealanders overseas. It also brought into force in New Zealand the Treaty of Rarotonga and other important disarmament measures New Zealand had signed. It established a Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control, a separate disarmament division in the Ministry of External Relations, and a Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament to the Minister, to which, unlike our successors at times, we actually appointed supporters of disarmament.

The Bill was strongly supported in Parliament by the Democratic Party but strongly opposed by National. Their stand was not really reflected by the public submissions, numbering an almost unprecedentedly vast 1236, of which all of 1225, or 99.1 %, broadly favoured the principles of the Bill. Apart from this root and branch opposition from a minority, there was some criticism and amendments sought by sections of the peace movement on two significant issues. One was the basis and procedure of the decisions whether or not to admit a vessel or

aircraft. In the end this was left as being whether or not the Prime Minister was satisfied it was not carrying nuclear weapons. The process of obtaining advice and information was not included, nor was any opportunity to challenge the basis of the Prime Minister's decision in the courts. In the end, the open-ended untidiness of such a hearing, and the security concerns it raised, counted for more than the small risk that a future pro-nuclear Prime Minister would blatantly allow in vessels groaning with nuclear bombs. The other issue was the provision for blanket approval for entry by classes of aircraft, a section which Prime Ministers have used to give blanket approval to US military flights through their Harewood base to Antarctica and Australia. In this case Lange was persuaded that the nuclear capable Starlifter aircraft, because of the lack of security precautions, in fact never brought in anything more dangerous to New Zealanders than marijuana, and that such a blanket exemption was justified, and would make it more likely that the base and its associated foreign exchange earnings remained there rather than in Hobart.

However the central issue in the Parliamentary debate as far as the National Opposition was concerned was that the nuclear free legislation weakened and destabilised the great anticommunist alliance and actually could threaten world peace and security. Labour's arguments rebutted this clearly and with passion. I still have my own second reading speech made on 12 February 1987, which was typical and extracts of which follow.

"Opposition members talked about the risk of destabilisation because of the Government's policy changing from a loyal, perhaps even servile, Western ally, to one taking a somewhat independent stance, might destabilise attitudes to the arms race. I believe that the world needs that kind of destabilisation, as at the moment it is heading steadily and inexorably towards nuclear war, and that lateral thinking is needed about the real means to achieve some security and peace. If people, not only those in western European countries but also those in eastern Europe, started to rethink their slavish adherence to a nuclear pact - and there have been some encouraging signs of that happening - the world would achieve some progress. I believe New Zealand should try to destabilise the inexorable move to nuclear war, and to bring about a change of attitudes."

"What kind of world do we live in? It is a world in which might is right, in which the most important place to put resources is into weaponry; in which the minds of the cream of people are used to produce more and more terrible weapons of war. That is the kind of world some members consider to be stable and healthy. It is an evil world, which the Government seeks to change into one in which resources and creative minds co-operate into combating disease and disharmony, and into promoting education and development. It will be a world in which the common values favour creating things that last rather than weapons that destroy. It will be a world of trust and love between nations rather than hatred and fear."

"The Government is establishing peace education and conflict resolution in the education system to enable young people to think about peaceful and co-operative ways of dealing with many disputes, both at the community level and internationally. The set of values in which might is right, the strong press on the weak, and people continue to be oppressed has existed too long. That needs to be changed by peaceful and assertive means which our children are learning and applying in our schools and communities. The Government has responded to

initiatives taken by most communities to establish nuclear-free zones. This legislation will create a nuclear-free New Zealand. The Government will continue, with the energy and commitment with which it has been empowered by the people, to act independently, creatively, and with energy and morality to help eventually to create a nuclear-free world."

Ten years ago the Bill passed its final reading. With this legislation, with the revolutions in eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War, with the final closure of nuclear testing bases in French Polynesia, with the comprehensive test ban treaty, and with the World Court's decision about the illegality of nuclear weapons, which owes so much to members of the New Zealand peace movement, many of my, and other Labour Government members, high and idealistic hopes have indeed come to pass. Also, unlike in the 1987 election campaign, in March 1990, the National Party finally accepted our anti-nuclear policy and legislation, making it a common central irreversible value of New Zealand politics. They have genuinely sought to consult and develop a multi-partisan nuclear and disarmament policy, most of it in fact initiated by Labour and Alliance MPs, now they are in government. However the almost intolerable internal, and particularly the international, pressure brought to bear on the 1984-90 Labour government and its members have had other lasting consequences that still present us with challenges.

The concern not to unnecessarily displease our former allies, now friends, sometimes contributed to the Labour Government developing more internal and international pro-market, laissez faire, economic and trade policies than could be justified in terms of fairness and environmental protection. The restrictions on the exchange of processed signals and other intelligence were used as a major justification for the questionable decision to establish the Waihopai signals intelligence system. When David Lange surprised us in 1989 by raising the possibility of withdrawal from the ANZUS Council, this was used by the Right in caucus to advance their campaign to depose him as leader, while leaving the future of this inoperable security alliance still unresolved.

The insecurity and uncertainty created by the withdrawal of US security guarantees led to the establishment of the Defence Committee of Inquiry chaired by Frank Corner in August 1986. It was empowered to carry out detailed consulting with, and opinion polling of, the public, and to come up with a report. The polling showed a clear movement of opinion in favour of our anti-nuclear policy but not sufficiently to avoid being misinterpreted by some members of the Committee as showing qualified support for nuclear warship visits. The Committee's membership was selected in the expectation and hope that it would come up with two conflicting reports. Unfortunately the peace movement supporter on the committee was so committed to conflict resolution that in fact an unlikely consensus was achieved resulting in just one report which endorsed nuclear warship visits in some circumstances.

The Labour Government then sought to develop a new defence and security framework by compiling a Defence White Paper. As our defence and foreign affairs advisers would still have insisted on inappropriate strategies, compiling the White Paper was co-ordinated by the Head of the Prime Minister's Department, John Henderson. The White Paper concluded that there was no immediately foreseeable threat of invasion, that we should concentrate on the South Pacific and on UN peacekeeping rather than defending South East Asia, that military

expenditure could be capped, and that our level of security could be restored to that previously provided by the US by closer military co-operation with Australia.

However the Australians then made it clear to our senior cabinet ministers that the price of them keeping relatively quiet about our anti-nuclear policy, in the face of strong criticism of them for snuggling up to the bomb coming from their own peace movement, was a major purchase of Australian military hardware that they were enhancing for themselves, namely the ANZAC frigate project. By the time the Parliamentary Labour Party came to make a final decision on the ANZAC frigate project the Cold War had ended and public opinion had continued to move inexorably in favour of our anti-nuclear defence and foreign policies. 80% of public opinion and of the caucus outside cabinet was opposed to the frigate purchase, including defence experts like Harry Duynhoven and Geoff Braybrooke and slashers of wasteful public spending like Roger Douglas. However Cabinet felt stuck with understandings and attitudes developed in the immediate uncertain aftermath of the Buchanan decision. At the foreign affairs caucus committee I tried to find out from David Lange what thrall the Australians held us in that led him to advocate such an unpopular decision. He said Australian Labor contained some direct and decisive people as some had found out when the concrete set around their legs and the cold waters of Melbourne Harbour engulfed them.

Maybe the memory of the Buchanan rejection was still too raw, and earlier undertakings to purchase two frigates were too definite for any other decision to have been possible at that time. But having been pressured once into buying that grossly technologically extravagant equipment based on a Cold War fleet support role, in the form of two ANZAC frigates, surely we can't be duped into buying any more!

The Nuclear Free Policy, the Legislation, and Defence

A Contribution to the 7 June Seminar, 1997
A Celebration - Ten Years of Nuclear Free Legislation

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The areas in which the 1984 nuclear free policy and the subsequent 1987 legislation have been claimed to have had the greatest impacts are foreign affairs and defence. The question of what problems have been posed for foreign affairs is addressed at this seminar by Colin Keating from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

It would have been very desirable for a representative from defence to address the question of policy impacts in this area. The Minister of Defence was not available, and both the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) declined an invitation to speak on the grounds that this was a political matter, and 'I believe that it would be inappropriate for the NZDF to provide a speaker', to quote the Chief of Defence Force.

Material will be presented here that has been gathered over the last two years or so, but much quite recently, that shows this is not a political matter. It is a matter of realities - have the impacts on defence arising from the 1984 nuclear policy been serious or not. The argument here is that in almost all cases, claims of serious effects on defence have been overstated or exaggerated because important factors have been concealed, in particular continuing military contacts between New Zealand and its allies.

There appears to be a surprising lack of detailed studies in this area. A study published in 1988 by Peter Jennings ([1]), then a teaching fellow at the Australian Defence Academy, presents a picture of potential problems for defence in New Zealand arising from the nuclear policy and the resulting ANZUS rift. He concludes that, 'The indications are that the break in ANZUS cooperative activity between New Zealand and the United States has indeed been costly to the armed forces of New Zealand.' It is argued here that his conclusions have not been borne out, fully at least, and are now out of date. An enquiry to the MOD library early in 1996 for information about other studies produced the reply, 'there is no recent analysis done by defence available'. No other extensive analysis is known of.

This is a very large topic, and can only be outlined in this paper. All the material presented will be covered more fully in working papers to be published by the Centre for Peace Studies.

We will look at how the position was seen by government officials soon after the ANZUS rift in 1985 and at the situation now, to assess the long term impacts, if any, on defence from this rift. The situation as it was seen in 1985 is presented using material from a chapter entitled `Impact of the ANZUS Rift' in a confidential 1986 Report of the Defence Review Officials Committee, referred to as the officials' report below, prepared for the government by a group of officials. A censored version of this report was released, the uncensored version is used here. Jennings cites extracts from the full version which he says was leaked, but does not present all the material that is seen as significant in this study.

As far as is know publicly, there have only been minor improvements in US-NZ/UK-NZ defence cooperation following the breakdowns that occurred during 1985 and 1986. It is reasonable, therefore, to examine current defence contacts between New Zealand and her allies to determine what the long term consequences of the nuclear stance put into effect in 1984 have been. This is done using information supplied under the Official Information Act (OIA) within the last year by the NZDF, and from other

material largely obtained as a result of work by members of the peace movement. Looking at the present position also provides information that relates directly to New Zealand's current strategic situation and its needs.

What then are claimed to have been the impacts on defence of the nuclear policy, and in the case of the United States, of the ANZUS rift.

Warship Visits

The most obvious effect publicly has been the cessation of visits by American and British warships, although the Royal Navy recommenced visits in 1995, and returned this year in June. These visits followed the removal of nuclear weapons from all surface ships and attack submarines in the American and British navies some years earlier.

Interestingly, neither the 1986 officials' report nor Jennings discuss this loss of port calls, or the loss of reciprocal port call opportunities for the New Zealand Navy (RNZN) as an important consequence of the nuclear policy. Yet as is well known, it was the refusal of a port call planned for March 1985 by the American destroyer Buchanan that signalled the beginning of restrictions on defence relations by the Americans, and some time later by the British. Further, it was claimed repeatedly by the Americans, the Australians, and by pre-1984 National governments that warship visits were a vital component of ANZUS - a vital element that Labour's nuclear policy and ship visit formula abrogated. This was claimed to be the basis for the ANZUS breakdown. The Buchanan incident is discussed in the light of new material obtained under the Official Information Act late in 1996 in a Centre for Peace Studies working paper nearing completion. The RNZN was permitted to use the US Navy Pearl Harbour naval base again for the first time since 1985 when New Zealand was invited to participate in United States celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war in the Pacific on 1 September 1995.

In related working papers it is argued that this cessation of warship visits had little to do with ANZUS. It reflected American and British concern at any challenge to their policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on warships or aircraft, or at any location (NCND). They used this policy, as did the Soviets undoubtedly, to take nuclear weapons covertly wherever they wished, regardless of the policies of countries like Denmark and Japan, their allies, that also called for nuclear weapons free ports in principle but included no enforcement mechanism. They were concerned to make an example of New Zealand, with its ship visit formula that challenged NCND, so that strategically important countries like Denmark and Japan would not be tempted to follow New Zealand's example and strengthen their own nuclear policies. NCND was a dishonest policy dishonourably applied while the nuclear navies were heavily nuclear armed.

This impact of the nuclear policy remains. It is not seen as important probably because most American and British warship visits were to show the flag and for rest and recreation. New Zealand has little to offer in terms of military supplies to these navies. But this was a very public change. The argument presented here, put in another form, is that the defence links seriously curtailed were the more visible ones, concealing a large number of other little known links that continued unchanged.

Joint Exercises

This is the area of curtailment most frequently cited by defence, the loss of opportunity for joint exercises with New Zealand's major allies. The Americans stopped these soon after the Buchanan refusal, and so subsequently did the British. But an important point emerges if we consider American reactions to the nuclear policy in 1984 after the election and early in 1985.

When Labour came to power in July 1984, two major ANZUS exercises had reached advanced stages of planning. These were Triad 84, involving land and air forces, and Sea Eagle 85, a maritime exercise. Triad 84 went ahead in October 1984 and saw American fighter aircraft, including nuclear capable aircraft, in the air over New Zealand. The Americans stated firmly that the exercise was covered by their NCND policy, but several New Zealand officials, David Thomson and Frank O'Flynn Ministers of Defence in the pre- and post-1984 governments respectively, and Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson, then Chief of Defence Force, confirmed publicly that no nuclear weapons would be carried. Planning for Sea Eagle 85 continued right up to early February 1985, just after the Buchanan refusal.

What this shows is that the Americans did not object to New Zealand having its nuclear policy as long as it did not interfere with American strategies and NCND. They could have stopped exercises in July 1984 if the existence of the nuclear policy was the real source of concern. What concerned the American military was the manner of application of the policy. Had New Zealand adopted a Danish style policy - no nuclear weapons in our ports but we trust our nuclear allies to honour this policy, or the Australian policy - no objections to nuclear powered vessels or to nuclear armed vessels in transit that make only brief port calls, New Zealand would have had no problems with the US Navy. Port calls and joint exercises would have continued as they do for Australia. American forces still do not exercise with New Zealand forces.

The British were more measured in their reactions to the nuclear policy. They also banned joint exercises but only in New Zealand's territorial waters. Major air, sea, and land exercises continued unchanged after 1984 and still continue. These are the so called Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) exercises involving forces from Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Britain, and New Zealand, held annually or bi-annually to the north of New Zealand, in the South China Sea for example. The latest in this series (exercise Flying Fish in April/May) has just been completed.

Information obtained under the Official Information Act from the NZDF in November 1996 shows that New Zealand forces took part in other joint exercises involving British forces during 1995 and 1996. These are outlined in table one below.

Table two lists the countries with which New Zealand forces exercised recently, including exercises within New Zealand by New Zealand forces alone. The exercises undertaken range quite widely in nature, extent, and complexity of course. The information in table two was taken from the NZDF Departmental Forecast Report 1 July 1996-30 June 1997.

The chief concern in the 1986 officials' report was with the loss of exercises with American forces, large scale forces equipped with the most advanced equipment. These exercises were generally designed to provide training for action in large multinational allied force structures facing high level threat situations. Loss of anti-submarine training was also cited. What needs to be considered now is what roles do we want our military to undertake in the future, and what equipment levels and exercise training programmes are appropriate. How important is the loss of contact with American forces. Do our forces need the most advanced military equipment, being discussed in military circles in terms of the latest new acronym, RMA or Revolution in Military Affairs, referring to the new generation of high tech electronic equipment now appearing.

Here it is argued that with a force of only around 10,000 active personnel and with a current budget of $1.6 billion, spending about 79% of this on maintaining what is referred to as a 'minimum level of capability' including the exercises listed should be adequate, or more than adequate depending on the defence philosophy adopted. New Zealand does not now face high level threats, and many would rather see more defence funding go to operations like UN peacekeeping, maritime patrol, and disaster relief.

Table 1- Exercises Involving British Forces 1995/96

Name	Nature
FPDA exercises	Air, sea, and land exercises, see above.
Longlook	Annual exchange with British armed forces, sees NZ troops exercising in Germany and Britain, has continued since before 1984.
Kauri Pine	Concurrent NZ infantry deployment to Hong Kong, and Gurkha infantry deployment to NZ - discontinued with the handover of Hong Kong.
Cygnet Globe	Biennial worldwide multinational communications exercise including units from the UK, US, and Australia.
Fincastle	Annual anti-submarine warfare exercise with British, Canadian, and Australian air forces.
Bullseye	Tactical air transport operation practise with British, Canadian, and Australian air forces.
Suman Warrior	Annual exercise for FPDA country forces to practise interoperability.
(Silver Anvil	Diving support exercise in 1989.)

Table 2 - Countries with which New Zealand Forces Exercised, 1996/97 Forecast

Country	Types of exercises
Britain	See Table 1
Australia	FPDA exercises, communications, anti-submarine, tactical air transport, ship safety and crew training, interoperability, maritime warfare, army field exercises, and training, low-level conflict training, electronic warfare, air attack and combat
Canada	Anti-submarine, tactical air transport
Malaysia	FPDA exercises, special air services jungle training, interoperability and commando operations
Singapore	FPDA exercises, tactical integration practice, operations within a division, interoperability
Brunei	Jungle training in a tropical terrain
Pacific Islands	Tropic conditions training, training in deployment to the area
New Zealand	Maritime air attack, air interdiction and air transport, computerised battlefield simulation, helicopter training in mountainous terrain, tactical air mobility, and counter terrorism.

This table is, of course, a very inadequate condensation of a large amount of material covering some 35 exercises of varying scale, but nearly all related to training for warfighting.

Intelligence

The officials' report describes intelligence as 'the most basic and fundamental requirement of defence policy'. It says that the United States halted its supply of finished or processed intelligence, intelligence briefings for New Zealand liaison officers, and participation in intelligence conferences where New Zealand was represented. Lange has stated that what was lost was American pre-packaged analyses of intelligence. Instead New Zealand received large quantities of undigested intelligence from which it had to make its own assessments. Others agree.

However, the report also says that these actions had relatively little effect on general information about New Zealand's immediate strategic environment and the South Pacific. It saw the most serious loss as being information on foreign ships in our area, particularly Soviet warships and force movements, and American information on weapons systems and force structures. The report says that the United States had undertaken to provide New Zealand with intelligence relating to threats to New Zealand and about counter espionage matters.

The supposed losses of intelligence will not be discussed at length because of what almost all accounts omit, and the officials' report only hints at. This is New Zealand's membership of the so-called UKUSA group, and the significance of this for intelligence. The non-governmental expert on this topic, Nicky Hager, is contributing to this seminar, and should be the person discussing this matter. His recent book, Secret Power[2], provides an astonishingly detailed analysis of New Zealand's intelligence community and its links through UKUSA with a global intelligence monitoring system involving the UK, US, Australia, Canada, and NZ, which was established after the second world war.

He sees the system as designed for the purpose of 'covertly intercepting and analysing radio communications from all countries round the world' later expanded with New Zealand involvement to include satellite information. This includes a wide range of intelligence information, not just military information. This echoes features of the types of information the officials' report states that New Zealand needed in the mid-1980s apart from military intelligence. This included information on economic matters, aid, shipping, fishing practices, political and diplomatic developments and the like in countries in our region, including information from Australia relevant to New Zealand's defence needs. This all to be obtained from intelligence sources.

The UKUSA organisation continued and continues its operations unaffected by the ANZUS rift, with little loss of important intelligence input to New Zealand. Hager describes it as,

> New Zealand's deepest, strongest and most valued alliance tie to the United States, Britain and Australia. (ref.2, p.57)

providing privileged access to intelligence from the massive global network.

New Zealand's involvement in UKUSA is bedevilled by secrecy Hager tells us, including secrecy from government.

> Politicians, whom the public has presumed will be monitoring the intelligence organisations on their behalf, have been systematically denied the information required to do that job. (ref.2, p.18)

He describes the situation (ref.2, p.18) as the ultimate example of bureaucratic capture, senior officials controlling their ministers rather than vice versa. New Zealand has built the Waihopai station, part of the UKUSA network, and the counterpart of the Geraldton station in Australia. Hager presents a detailed account of the functions of Waihopai. He

also sees the loss of finished intelligence from the United States as unimportant (ref.2, p.21 1).

The cold war is over, and the Russian Navy is in disarray. Russia in any case is now a friend and trading partner. Do we still need intelligence relating to the movement of Russian vessels. Even the officials' report did not see the intelligence losses it discusses as an irreparable disaster, an impression often given in the aftermath of the ANZUS breakdown. It saw the situation as providing an opportunity for New Zealand to reshape its intelligence community to suit New Zealand's needs. It did not, of course, discuss UKUSA in this regard.

The impact of the ANZUS rift on intelligence was exaggerated in the mid-1980s by concealing fundamental intelligence alliance links. What is of concern now is the question of what intelligence information it is legitimate for New Zealand to seek and through what means. What intelligence activities should New Zealand now be engaged in, and how can we ensure that the government and the public are informed about, and aware of, what is being done.

We will meet further manifestations of the UKUSA structure.

Equipment Supply

The officials' report states that New Zealand was heavily dependent on the United States for the supply and maintenance of a wide range of military items, and feared possible future serious effects on the continuation of this supply. New Zealand was downgraded from the status of 'ally' to that of 'friend' for military sales. Nevertheless, the officials' report acknowledged that up to the time it was prepared, there had been only minor changes in logistics cooperation with the United States and no adverse effect on the operational effectiveness of New Zealand's armed forces.

Associate Professor Steve Hoadley from the Political Studies Department, University of Auckland, examined this situation in a 1988 paper[3]. He saw the main effect being some increase in processing time for New Zealand requests for equipment purchases, but concluded that this area of cooperation - an aspect of logistics cooperation - was not seriously imperilled by the ANZUS rift. The logistics relationship was alive and well he wrote in 1987-88, and reported major defence purchases from the United States in 1986 and 1987, the year the nuclear policy became law. He saw logistics cooperation surviving the ANZUS dispute.

The purchase by New Zealand during 1995-96 of the Phalanx close-in weapons system from America, and in 1996 of a relatively new US Navy ship for use in underwater research, with no objections or hindrance from the US Government, supports this conclusion. Air New Zealand also maintains US Navy aircraft in Christchurch.

The 1991 government Defence Policy Paper does indicate some increase in costs from holding extra stocks and spare parts because of the ANZUS rift, costed at $22 million a year over 15 years starting from 1986. This amounts to about 1.5% to 2% of the defence budget annually since 1986, not a major factor in defence spending. The 1991 paper reports that only about $60 million had been spent so far, financial constraints causing the programme to be cut back, with a resulting lack of reserve stocks or assurance of quick resupply.

By contrast, New Zealand has for many years participated in regular meetings of senior military personnel from the Asia-Pacific region, including the United States, with a special interest in logistics, the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar or PASOLS meetings. Begun in 1971, these meetings provide opportunities to exchange information on logistics, and to foster regional cooperation. In 1994, for example, 115 delegates from 29 countries attended the PASOLS meeting in Malaysia. This is one of

a considerable number of military contacts New Zealand has maintained with the United States despite the ANZUS dispute.

There has been no serious impact in this area from the nuclear legislation, any problems resulting much more from defence budgeting levels and priorities.

Training and Personnel Exchange

The group who prepared the officials' report expressed concern over the possible loss of operational effectiveness that New Zealand's forces might suffer through the loss of training in exercises with United States forces. Present access to training in exercises has been discussed, and the basic questions raised there recur here. Do our forces need training with American forces now to maintain a satisfactory level of operational effectiveness. The answer again depends on the defence philosophy adopted. Other areas of training were also seen as affected, but not so extensively. Training in the United States for the RNZN, for example, was conducted by the commercial suppliers of equipment rather than the American Government, and continues, the report states. Further, RNZN training was traditionally patterned on that of the British and Australian navies, the report tells us. Access for the New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) to maintenance training courses at tradesman level in the United States also continued.

MOD Annual Reports show, however, that New Zealand military personnel did continue to attend conferences and courses in the United States including courses at American military facilities, during 1985-87 for example. Later Annual Reports do not provide this information in explicit form.

Very importantly, New Zealand was not excluded from meetings of a number of multilateral defence forums of which it was a member or associate. The officials' report lists those in Table three.

Table 3 - Multilateral Forums New Zealand Attends

ABCA	A standardisation agreement between the American, British, Canadian and Australian (ABCA) armies. New Zealand has been an associate member since 1965.
PAMS	Annual Pacific Area Management Seminars (PAMS) attended by military representatives from most Pacific rim countries, including the US.
ASCC	The Air Standardisation Coordinating Committee (ASCC) comprises the forces of the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (the UKUSA group again).
TTCP	The Technical Cooperation Programme (TTCP) relates to non-nuclear research and development in the group of ABCA countries.
CCEB	The Combined Communications-Electronics Board (CCEB).
AUSCANNZUKUS NAVCOMMS	A naval command, control, and communications organisation.
COMBEXAG	The Combined Exercise Agreement (COMBEXAG), an ABCA group agreement providing standard operating procedures for exercises in the Pacific.

Some of these agreements have not been released publicly. **PASOLS** has been discussed. New Zealand also attends annual United States organised Pacific Armies' Reserve Components Seminars **(PARCS)** aimed at exchanging information about the training and organisation of reserve components of Pacific armies. Colonel D J McGuire attended for New Zealand in 1992 for example. Another forum attended by New Zealand is the Pacific Air Chiefs Conference (**PACC**) hosted every two years by the United States The Chiefs of the air forces from 12 Asia-Pacific countries attended in 1994, to discuss developments in air doctrine and to facilitate an interchange of ideas on air force related matters, the purpose of PACC meetings

ABCA - Aims to achieve the highest level of interoperability and economy of resources between the ABCA armies. The ABCA programme contributes valuable information required by the New Zealand Army in the development of force structure and equipment requirements. There is also an ABCA Navies programme.

PAMS - Coordination of training programmes and military assistance programmes is discussed at PAMS seminars. Recent meetings have been attended by -representatives of 35 countries including the US, UK, and Russia.

ASCC - Seeks to standardise air force doctrine and operating procedures, and promote economy in research and development. It is the RNZAF's main source for the acquisition of tactical, technical, and safety information.

TTCP - Our Defence Scientific Establishment is involved in TTCP, which acquaints participating countries with each other's non-nuclear defence research and development programmes thus avoiding unnecessary duplication. It also seeks to close important gaps in the collective technology base.

CCEB - This organisation seeks to improve interoperability in communications command and control systems in support of command and control, and decides the content, format, and release policy of Allied Communications Publications.

AUSCANNZUKUS NAVCOMMS - Is aimed at monitoring the development of naval communications command and control equipment and procedures, to maintain and improve interoperability.

COMBEXAG - Its aims have been outlined, and New Zealand is still a member. The details are classified.

The NZDF Corporate Plan 1992-1993 states that,

The NZDF and single services are signatories to 12 standardization and interoperability agreements with Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and the United States. These agreements call for active participation in some 130 working groups and committees which meet on a rotational basis in respective countries. The NZDF will host some committees or working groups each year.

These forum names and details were deleted from the public version of the officials' report which says,

It cannot be overemphasised that continued access to these forums is of fundamental importance to New Zealand's armed forces.

These forums and agreements involve the same group of countries that figure in relation to New Zealand's intelligence links with its allies, the UKUSA group.

Jennings refers to these agreements as continuing NZ-UK-US contacts. He says that,

If ANZUS provided the skeleton of alliance cooperation, then the web of UKUSA arrangements were the muscles and sinews which gave substance to that cooperation. (ref. 1, p.24)

He feared that access to these contacts might be restricted because of the ANZUS problem. The evidence shows otherwise.

Access has continued to these and other ABCA/UKUSA group cooperative arrangements. The agreements listed in Table three are only some of a considerable number of agreements of various kinds linking these countries. They are too numerous to list here. The peace movement has listed many of them at times in the past. Some of the agreements and documents are presented and discussed in the publication The ANZUS Documentst[4].

Finally we examine material released under the Official Information Act by the NZDF in November 1996 referred to already, listing meetings and training courses New Zealand military personnel attended during 1995 and 1996 that also involved British military personnel, and in January 1997 listing similar contacts with American forces. Many involve the UKUSA forums.

Contacts with British military forces described by the NZDF are summarised below.

Meetings and Courses Attended 1995-96 Involving the British Military

ABCA Navies	RNZN personnel attended meetings covering technical topics.
Courses	11 courses ranging from systems management to maritime tactics, anti-submarine warfare, and naval control of shipping, this latter exposing New Zealand officers to concepts and procedures being developed by NATO and the US. Training contacts related to UN activities.
Exchange programmes	Two naval exchange programmes.

Contacts with American military forces the NZDF described are summarized next.

Meetings and Courses Attended 1995-96 Involving the US Military

TTCP	NZDF staff attended 67 meetings with US defence science personnel in the US, Canada, Australia, UK, and NZ. New Zealand hosted or part hosted 10 of these.
ASCC	The RNZAF participated in 20 ASCC working party meetings at which USAF personnel were present.
ABCA	Under the ABCA Armies programme, the NZ Army sent observers to 16 working group conferences in the US, UK, France, Canada, and Australia, and hosted two more in NZ.
CCEB	The Director of Joint Command, Control, Communications, and Information Systems attended CCEB meetings in the UK (1995) and the US *(1996).* Senior communications and electronics officers from the US were present at both.
COMBEXAG	RNZN personnel attended two reviews of the COMBEXAG 5 Agreement, one in 1995 and one in 1996.

AUSCANNZUKUS	RNZN personnel attended meetings of the AUSCANNZUKUS naval communications interoperability forum in Washington in 1996. An RNZN employee commenced a three year appointment in December 1996 as AUSCANNZUKUS secretary in Washington.
Courses	Ten NZ Army personnel attended 7 courses in the US. One RNZN supply officer attended a logistics development course in the US in 1995.
Meetings/Conferences	RNZN personnel attended the 13th International Sea Power Symposium, a software conference, and the Naval Tactical Database Conference, all in the US. RNZN members attended meetings in the US of a US Navy working group reviewing and updating naval communications. Deputy Director of Joint Operations, NZDF, attended a symposium on East Asian Security in Hawaii, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore in 1996. Sponsored by the US State Department, the aim was to create an opportunity for security leaders in the AsiaPacific region to meet and share views on matters of concern. Twenty-four participants from 19 countries attended. NZ also attends the Westpac Naval Symposiums hosted every two years by the US Chief of Naval Operations, and attended by representatives of upwards of 50 navies.
Other Contacts	The Chief of Naval Staff visited Hawaii in 1996 for the change of command ceremony for the Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Fleet. NZDF staff have contacts with British and US counterparts in various UN operations. The RNZN has routine contact with the US Navy Sea Systems Command regarding replenishment of spares, and advice concerning US equipment the RNZN has, including equipment on the new ANZAC frigates. **PAMS**, **PASOLS, PACC, PARCS** have been discussed.

The NZDF letter listing contacts with the United States military concludes by stating that information concerning some further contacts has been withheld under the OIA. Many of these activities would have also involved the British through being UKUSA structure activities.

The 67 TTCP meetings covered a range of topics including stress management, elite combat, command control and communications, electronic warfare, aeronautics technology, and had a strong emphasis on aspects of undersea warfare. The 20 ASCC working party meetings covered topics including air armament, maintenance and servicing, logistics, operations and doctrine, nuclear-biological-chemical defensive measures. Observers were present at Quadripartite ABCA working group conferences that included the topics; armour, electronic warfare, infantry, communications, artillery, logistics, nuclear-biological-chemical defence.

Conclusion

It would have been very valuable to have had a defence spokesperson to present and discuss this material. From a lay perspective it suggests strongly that New Zealand is not suffering any serious long term adverse effects from the nuclear policy in the defence area. This is particularly so when the material is viewed in the light of the

present relatively benign strategic situation. Jennings opens his book with the quote, 'Practical cooperation is the life blood of any defence association', from the 1987 Defence Review. It appears that New Zealand is much less deprived of 'practical cooperation' than is often suggested. The fundamental role of the UKUSA group should also be clearly apparent.

For the future, there are very important questions New Zealand and New Zealanders need to be examining. Simon Upton, one of our present government ministers, said in 1987 during the debates on the legislation,

> If Government members were truly against nuclear weapons they would say that being in an alliance with a country that possesses them taints the alliance. I should have thought that was honest. Even being allied to Australia which is allied to America would be too much. That would be the honest policy - if the Government held to that its case would have much more credibility.

He also said that strong supporters of the legislation should be advocating leaving ANZUS formally. This was directed at Labour at the time, but raises a question which is still fundamental for defence. What defence relationships, if any, should a strongly nuclear free country have with countries that still advocate nuclear deterrence.

New Zealanders should be debating the question of what future defence structure they see as appropriate for our country, and what its main priorities should be. Should we spend by far the larger portion of the defence budget on training for war fighting, or should a greater proportion than at present be directed to peacekeeping operations, maritime surveillance and disaster relief. At present these three areas receive about 2%, 3%, and 2.4% respectively of the total defence budget.

A defence review is in progress now, but without public input. We should be given the opportunity to express our views now that the strategic situation has changed, even from what it was in 1991 when the last review was made. Further, security is now being seen quite differently, as many faceted, including social, economic, and environmental factors as well as military factors. Should we have a regional security role, and contribute to a regional defence system. If so, what types and scale of forces is appropriate. How does this compare with the scale of forces needed for New Zealand's perceived national defence needs, and for peacekeeping, maritime surveillance, and disaster relief. There is a need for quantitative analysis of these questions, rather than the stream of qualitative discussions we are seeing.

But underlying all this must be the fact we are celebrating today. New Zealand became truly nuclear free for the first time in July 1984, and will have been nuclear free by law for ten years on 8 June 1997, the only country to legislate to be nuclear free. We must continue to celebrate this achievement, and to demonstrate it forcefully in our continued opposition to nuclear weaponry and any threat of its use, and by being a driving force for a peaceful world.

David Lange concludes his book, Nuclear Free - The New Zealand Way, by saying,

New Zealand will always be an affront to the advocates of deterrence, and always be a comfort to the supporters of disarmament. And that, in the end, is all we set out to be.

This tenth anniversary is a time to reaffirm our commitment to these aims, and to our continuing efforts to do more.

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A CELEBRATION - 10 YEARS OF NUCLEAR FREE LEGISLATION
(Jointly organised by the University Centre for Peace Studies and the Peace Foundation)

ADDRESS BY CHRISTINE BOGLE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE

Thank you for that introduction. I am sorry that Deputy Secretary Colin Keating was not able to be here to present this speech.

Since other speakers have spoken about the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Legislation from a historical perspective, I would like to concentrate on the current disarmament scene and New Zealand's role in it..

It is important to remember that the Nuclear free Legislation covered a broad range of issues. The establishment of the zone is only one aspect of the Act's objectives. In many ways the Act is the platform on which New Zealand's involvement in Disarmament and Arms Control issues for the following decade was based. I would like to spend a few moments outlining these aspects of the Treaty.

The nuclear free legislation is very much a part of the broader Disarmament and Arms Control picture. As well as establishing the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone the Act also implements five treaties that are crucial parts of the history of international disarmament. These are:

- the South Pacific Nuclear free Zone Treaty,
- the Partial Test Ban Treaty,
- the Non Proliferation Treaty,
- the Seabed Arms Control Treaty and
- the Biological Weapons Convention.

This list represents the most significant global and regional disarmament achievements that had been reached in 1987. The Act therefore consolidated New Zealand's commitments. As well as setting in concrete our status as an anti nuclear nation, the Act also gave us the credentials to participate in the global nuclear disarmament arena.

I think that this is an important point. The Act is not just about unilateral measures to prevent nuclear weapons entering New Zealand. It also placed New Zealand in the thick of global work on nuclear disarmament. The inclusion of the Biological Weapons Convention, and the other provisions on Disarmament inspectors, broadens the scope of the legislation again. The Act was designed to establish an active disarmament and arms control policy on a wide range of issues, not just nuclear.

The Act also sets the stage for an ongoing engagement in these issues. This is primarily through the establishment of the position of Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control. It also provided for the formation of the Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control. The objectives of this committee include to advise the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade on disarmament and arms control matters, and to make funding grants for promoting greater public understanding of disarmament and arms control matters.

The 1987 legislation therefore set the scene for New Zealand's involvement in the disarmament and arms control issues. It provided us with a number of guiding precepts for our engagement in these issues. First, it pointed to the importance of engagement in all fora, be they multilateral, regional or unilateral. Second, it made clear that New Zealand would not focus exclusively on nuclear issues - other disarmament issues needed our attention as well. And finally, and perhaps most importantly, it established our credentials. No one could doubt that New Zealand had something to say, and was prepared to live with the consequences of its actions.

And so ten years down the track, where have we got to? Have we lived up to the aspirations contained in the legislation? I firmly believe that we have. New Zealand is actively engaged in a wide range of disarmament and arms control processes. I would like to run through the current state of play in these issues, focusing on the role New Zealand is taking.

I will start with the most recent achievement, the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. From the early 1970s, during a period of worldwide protest against plans by France to resume atmospheric nuclear weapon testing at Mururoa, New Zealand and Australia were active proponents of a comprehensive ban. In 1972 a resolution of the Stockholm Conference on Environment and Development called for an end to all nuclear tests. Since 1972 New Zealand and Australia annually promoted a resolution calling for an end to all nuclear tests at the United Nations General Assembly. In 1991 their effort was supported by a similar initiative of Mexico.

In August 1993 the efforts of New Zealand and its test ban supporters bore fruit. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva authorised the commencement of formal talks on a comprehensive test ban, and agreed on a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Negotiations on a "rolling" text of the treaty began in January 1994.

New Zealand's overriding objective during the negotiations was to have all nuclear explosions banned by law as soon as possible. For much of the negotiation the nuclear weapon States had sought agreement among themselves on activities which would not be banned, some of which involved nuclear explosions with small yields. However, the nuclear weapon states eventually responded to pressure from the non nuclear states, and announced their support for a ban on all nuclear explosions.

The procedure for bringing the Treaty into force was another crucial issue. The majority, including New Zealand, wanted to ensure its early entry into force, and opposed any procedure that would allow any state to hold hostage the entry into force of the Treaty by refusing to ratify the Treaty. Unfortunately this did not prove possible, and the Treaty will not enter into force until all states with a nuclear industry, including the 5 nuclear weapons states and the 3 threshold states, have ratified it. I am sorry to say that this does not look likely to occur soon, as India has indicated that it has not intention of signing the treaty in the foreseeable future.

However, the international community has decided to proceed on the basis that the Treaty will enter into force at some point. New Zealand has supported this approach. In order to achieve confidence in the treaty, an international monitoring network to verify the test ban will be needed. Steps have been made to establish an International Monitoring System (IMS) to monitor the atmosphere, underground and underwater environments using four technologies: seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound.

New Zealand has been closely involved in the development of the IMS and in preliminary work underway in the seismic, radionuclide and hydroacoustic fields. Some existing New Zealand stations will become part of the monitoring network, while a number of new stations will be established in New Zealand and the South Pacific. This network needs to be up and running before the treaty enters into force, to give added assurance that signatories will respect the undertaking to refrain from testing. In addition to the moral force of their having signed the treaty, nuclear weapon States will be aware that any testing activity would be detectable through the networks.

New Zealand is taking a close interest in the establishment process, maintaining a strong desire to see the treaty's provisions implemented efficiently and in a contained time frame. A series of meetings of the Preparatory Commission, which is overseeing the establishment of the IMS, and its working groups will be held during 1997 and 1998 to address technical issues and consider financial, contractual and administrative arrangements.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. This is the only multilateral organisation which negotiates new disarmament treaties. As well as the CTBT, it negotiated the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty.

It is worth noting that New Zealand only became a member of the Conference last year in the final stages of the CTBT negotiations. Until then we had been an active observer, participating in the work of the Conference and making suggestions where appropriate. The agreement to admit New Zealand, along with 22 other aspirants, to full membership of the Conference came after a long campaign. Our membership has enhanced our capacity to contribute to the work of the Conference. The government has acknowledged the importance of this development, and our first separately designated Disarmament Ambassador to the Conference takes up his appointment next month.

He does so at a difficult time for the CD. There has been a prolonged disagreement about the CD's work programme since the conclusion of the CTBT. This dispute has led to the polarisation of the Conference. On one side are the radical members of the Non Aligned Movement, who want to see negotiations on nuclear disarmament take place in a timebound framework, and on the other the nuclear weapon states, who argue that the CD should not address nuclear disarmament at all. As decisions of the CD have to be unanimous, the impasse is proving difficult to break.

New Zealand is therefore working with other likeminded countries to find a proposal in the middle ground which can command support from the entire CD membership. The Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, the Rt Hon Don McKinnon proposed to the CD in a speech in February the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a fissile material cut off convention, and to discuss nuclear disarmament more generally.

So far the CD has not reached agreement on this or any other approach to its work programme. It will take a considerable amount of goodwill and compromise on both sides of the debate to resolve the outstanding issues. New Zealand will continue to explore ways to move out of the current impasse. However, I would have to say that I am not optimistic that the CD will be able to agree on a work programme soon. After the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1992 there was a similar lengthy break until negotiations on the CTBT began.

However, the CD is not the only option for making progress towards nuclear disarmament. Several other options exist, both global and regional.

Another forum in which we can put pressure on the nuclear weapons states to move on nuclear disarmament is in context of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty is the corner stone of the modern nuclear non proliferation and disarmament framework. Negotiated in the 19G0's it is essentially a bargain between those states who have nuclear weapons and those who do not. States without nuclear weapons agree never to develop them, in exchange for access to technical assistance, and an undertaking on behalf of the nuclear weapon states to negotiate towards complete nuclear disarmament.

In 1995 the Treaty was extended indefinitely, despite widespread concern that the nuclear weapon states were not moving rapidly enough towards complete nuclear disarmament. New Zealand supported this decision. Whatever the defects of the Treaty and its implementation, the indefinite extension sent a strong message to those countries who might have nuclear ambitions that nuclear weapons are unacceptable.

The 1995 review and Extension Conference also agreed on a set of Principles and Objectives to govern the ongoing review process instituted by the Treaty. These principles and objectives reaffirmed the goal of complete nuclear disarmament, and

contained a plan of action to achieve that objective. New Zealand strongly supported the adoption of these Principles and Objectives. It is our hope that countries will be more accountable as the review process to monitor compliance with the Treaty is strengthened.

Earlier this year the first preparatory meeting took place for the next NPT review conference to be held in 2000. This was the first opportunity to put to the test the enhanced review process that had been mandated by the 1995 Conference. While it is still early days, the first indications are good. We do indeed seem to have a qualitatively enhanced process, which will allow us to keep the pressure on the nuclear weapon states to accelerate the progress towards complete nuclear disarmament.

The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice has provided nuclear disarmament with a significant push in the right direction. New Zealand has a special connection with this opinion - the original call for the International Court of Justice to examine the question of the legality of nuclear weapons came from the New Zealand NGO community. New Zealand was one of only two Western Countries to vote for the UNGA resolution which requested the opinion from the Court. The other was San Marino.

Along with many countries, New Zealand made representations to the Court on the question before it. The result was a long and extremely complex opinion, which contained much of interest. New Zealand attached special significance to the unanimous finding that:

> There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

This finding provided a useful reminded that the obligation on those states who possess nuclear weapons to disarm is a binding one. Hopefully, the Court's findings will promote progress on nuclear disarmament in all global fora.

Another step forward in connection with the NPT was the recent adoption by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, of which New Zealand is a member, of stronger measures to detect the illegal production of nuclear weapons. The strengthened safeguards will give the IAEA greater powers to verify that states which are parties to nuclear non-proliferation treaties, such as the NPT and nuclear weapon free zone treaties, are not producing nuclear weapons. These powers include access to more locations in a country's territory and the use of state-of-the-art technologies to detect nuclear activities. The need for stronger measures became clear early in the 1990s following revelations about Iraq's nuclear programme. New Zealand was one of the countries which pushed strongly for the approval of the new measures, which will allow the IAEA to continue to play its crucial role in support of the non-proliferation system, and provide a basis for nuclear disarmament.

New Zealand is also working on a regional level to promote nuclear disarmament, through the mechanism of nuclear weapon free zones. The negotiation of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was an important achievement for the South Pacific region. Last year the Treaty passed its final hurdle, when the France, the UK and the US signed on to the Protocols to the Treaty (the then USSR and China had done so several years before.)

Other such developments make it clear that nuclear weapon free zones are attracting increasing attention and support as a means of expressing and promoting commonly held values in the areas of nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. Many parts of the world are now covered by nuclear weapon free zones, including Latin America, Africa and South East Asia, as well as the South Pacific.

Taken together, the four existing and prospective zones potentially include some 114 nations. With the addition of Antarctica, demilitarised under the Antarctic Treaty, they cover more than 50% of the earth's landmass. Virtually all the southern hemisphere, and significant parts of the northern hemisphere, are now covered by nuclear-weapon free zones. Increasingly, the states concerned see such zones as underpinning progress towards a world without nuclear weapons. They signify the gradual marginalisation of nuclear weapons in international security.

In our view there is potential to build on these advances in a way which reinforces progress towards nuclear disarmament. At this stage we see scope for developing political links between the four existing or potential nuclear-weapon-free zones. This was recognised by last year's UNGA 51 resolution, which called on the states parties and signatories to the four treaties' to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation.
That then is the current state of play on nuclear disarmament. Progress is certainly not nearly as quick as we would like. However, the pressure is being kept on in a number of fora for progress towards the ultimate goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. New Zealand is actively engaging in the process wherever possible, and will continue to do what it can to move the issue forward.

But it is important to remember that nuclear weapons are not the only weapons of mass destruction in existence. Biological and Chemical Weapons also pose a significant threat to security. Indeed these weapons are in some ways more dangerous than nuclear weapons, as they are considerably easier to develop and deploy.

I am pleased to say that the news in relation to these weapons is better. Treaties outlawing these weapons have been concluded, and enjoy the support of nearly all the international community. I would like to comment on both treaties, and talk a little about the role New Zealand has played in their development.

First, Chemical Weapons. I mentioned earlier that one of the CD's main achievements was a treaty outlawing Chemical Weapons. This treaty was concluded in 1992 and entered into force last April. It is arguably the most important disarmament treaty in history. For the first time, an entire class of weapons has been entirely prohibited, with verification measures to ensure that this remains so, including inspection procedures and sanctions against transgressor countries. We see this Convention as being of great significance, and its full implementation will make a real difference in improving the global security outlook. The Sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway, and the revelations about the Iraqi programme have made it clear that these weapons are out there.

The First Conference of States Party to the Convention, recently concluded at The Hague, established the permanent organisation, the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which will carry out these difficult tasks. New Zealand has always been a firm supporter of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and so we noted with satisfaction - and a certain measure of relief - the ratification of the treaty by nearly ninety countries, including the United States and China. Of declared chemical weapon possessor states only Russia has not yet ratified, but it has pledged to do so later this year.

In concert with other countries, we will be doing what we can to encourage Russia and other non parties to the Convention to ratify it at the earliest opportunity. The CWC will only be fully effective when it has universal or near universal support. We will also work within the new organisation to ensure that it carries out its mandate efficiently and effectively.

Progress is also being made in the battle against Biological Weapons. The Biological Weapons Convention, entered into force in 1975, was an effort to ban the use of diseases such as anthrax and salmonella as weapons of warfare. However, this Convention contained no verification provisions of the type found in the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Some states, such as Iraq, have taken advantage of this deficiency in the Convention, and have continued to develop steadily more sophisticated biological weapons. These weapons have advanced in sophistication as biological and genetic sciences have advanced. New Zealand, and a group of like-minded countries, is attempting to remedy this: our aim is to put backbone into the Biological Weapons Convention by establishing a verification protocol like that in the Chemical Weapon Convention.

Progress has been slow, but steady. The Third Review Conference of the Convention in 1991 began the process of looking at ways to strengthen the Convention. The fourth Review conference in December 1996 was able to agree to start negotiations on a rolling text of a verification protocol to the Convention. New Zealand has supported and helped achieve these developments, and we will continue to work hard to ensure that an effective verification regime is established as soon as possible.

We have also been working hard to ensure that the verification regime includes plant and animal pathogens such as foot-and-mouth disease, as well as biological weapons which can affect humans. In an agricultural economy like New Zealand, these pathogens could have a devastating effect on our environment and our livelihoods.

Overall, our approach to Biological and Chemical Weapons has been the same as our approach to those involving nuclear weapons. The overall aim is to be constructively engaged in the debate, and to make constructive suggestions where possible.

I would also like to comment on the role we are playing in the international campaign to rid the world of anti personnel landmines. The campaign to ban these weapons, which has been a focus of NGO activity for many years, has only in the last eighteen months become a major focus of governments around the world.

At present the primary international instrument dealing with anti personnel landmines is the Inhumane Weapons Convention (IWC). Protocol II of the Convention contains restrictions on the use of mines, and booby traps. Amendments to the Protocol were agreed on in 1996, and significantly tightened up the controls. However the outcome was disappointing to a number of countries who belong to the IWC. They had hoped to see much quicker progress towards a total ban on anti personnel landmines. A number, including New Zealand, had already taken a step in that direction by unilaterally renouncing the use of anti personnel landmines.

Two events added momentum to the call for a total ban on anti personnel landmines. A meeting in Ottawa in October 1996 to build on the growing support for a total ban was attended by 50 countries. At that meeting Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy challenged the international community to return to Ottawa in December 1997 to sign a treaty outlawing the use of all anti personnel landmines. And in November 1996 the United Nations General Assembly passed by an overwhelming majority a resolution urging "states to pursue vigorously an agreement ...to ban ...landmines with a view to completing the negotiation as soon as possible".

There are two main options for pursuing the goal of concluding a treaty banning anti personnel landmines: the Ottawa treaty process, and possible negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. Some countries argue that only the CD can negotiate an agreement which will command universal support, as it contains a broad range of countries. However discussions on the CD's agenda are proving very divisive, and any agreement to discuss a landmines ban is unlikely to be reached until all the other issues are also sorted out. So the CD is not going to deliver the ban sought by the international commuility, as encapsulated in the UNGA resolution, in the near future.

That leaves the Ottawa process as the only current available option for negotiating a global ban. The aim remains to produce a treaty ready for signature by the end of 1997. A draft treaty has been produced, and there will be a meeting in Brussels in June to discuss the text at which New Zealand will be represented. However this process does

not include all the key landmine producing and using countries. The practical effect of the convention will therefore be limited, although the treaty should create a political norm against the use of anti personnel landmines. Given that it represents the best chance for making progress in the near future, New Zealand has decided to give its support to this process, although we would not oppose in addition negotiation in the CD if that proved possible.

Labour
NewZealand 2000

Rt Hon Helen Clark
Leader of the Opposition

Address to the

Foundation for Peace Studies & Auckland University Centre for Peace Studies

on

Ten Years of Nuclear Free Legislation

7 June 1997

Thanks are due to the Auckland University Centre for Peace Studies and the Foundation for Peace Studies for organising this seminar to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the passage of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act.

I do wish to pay tribute to all those who played a part in building the climate of opinion which supported the Labour Government taking the ground-breaking step to legislate for New Zealand's nuclear tree status. The legislation was passed against the wishes of all those countries with which New Zealand had traditionally been allied.

Make no mistake: it is very difficult for governments to act on such matters without a groundswell of support in the community.

In other portfolios, like health, I have personally had the experience of advancing far-sighted legislation which affronted powerful groups; for example the Smoke-free Environments Act. Without strong and vocal support from informed groups in the community, such moves are very difficult indeed to take.

In the 1980s the nuclear free movement was very broadly based in New Zealand. The Mt Albert Peace Group in my own electorate was but one of many dozens of neighbourhood groups working to make their town, city, suburb, or county nuclear free.

I recall speaking from Kaitaia to Waipukurau to Invercargill in support of those local nuclear free zone campaigns and of the broader cause of nuclear disarmament.

Then there were always the nationwide groups: the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the New Zealand branch of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the Foundation for Peace Studies itself, and the Peace Squadron and other groups and coalitions which formed to oppose the visits of nuclear warships and co-ordinate lobbying of government and members of Parliament on nuclear issues.

It was against this background that the Labour Government, led by David Lange, was able to act, even though establishment opinion in the bureaucracy and defence forces was against what we did and worked to weaken it.

Considerable efforts were made within the foreign affairs and defence establishments to stop New Zealand confronting the "neither confirm nor deny" policy of its allies. The *USS Buchanan* was sent on its way to New Zealand in the hope that its acceptance would blur our nuclear free policy. The *Buchanan* was a conventionally-powered vessel, but it was nuclear capable. There could be no certainty that it was not nuclear armed. Therefore its entry to New Zealand would have breached our policy of ensuring that no nuclear weapons came to our ports. That is why the *Buchanan's* visit was stopped. That New Zealand decision led to the United States' unilateral decision to suspend New Zealand's involvement in ANZUS.

I do not underestimate what a bitter pill to swallow these developments were for many in the civil service and the defence forces. New Zealand's foreign and defence policies had been closely aligned with those of Washington, Canberra, and London for decades. Those who

formulated those policies perceived New Zealand's defence arrangements as being a small cog in a much larger allied machine. They saw New Zealand as having influence only insofar as it had the ear of other larger powers. When the Labour Government's policy led to the casting of New Zealand outside the allied orbit on defence matters, there were some who felt that their whole life's work getting New Zealand involved inside it had been destroyed.

Conversely, I have had feedback from others who felt a secret pleasure that the years of lickspittling and subservience were gone, and that New Zealand could stand tall for its own beliefs.

That was certainly very much the way I viewed it. My views on New Zealand foreign and defence policy developed in the late 'sixties and early 'seventies. I saw a National Government send troops to Vietnam to keep New Zealand's allies happy. I saw a National Government inert on the threat of nuclear war and nuclear testing. I saw a National Government impervious to the immorality of apartheid. I resolved to back Norman Kirk as the Labour Leader of the time who was prepared to act on all these issues. I was proud to be a member of the Fourth Labour Government which further developed foreign and defence policies reflecting New Zealand's concerns and aspirations and our desire to contribute to the building of a more peaceful and just world.

What are the challenges before us now?

My first message is to avoid complacency about our nuclear free status and our present relative detachment from great power alliances. The positioning New Zealand achieved has never had acceptance in the defence establishment, and with its encouragement the National Party in government has worked assiduously to revive American interest in New Zealand's defence arrangements.

In February this year, the Minister of Defence, Paul East, went to Hawaii and visited nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable warships. Recently in a speech to the New Zealand Special Air Service Group Regimental Mess Dinner at Hobsonville, Mr East attacked New Zealand's strong nuclear free stance, describing the moves in the 'eighties as an "extreme anti-nuclear swing". He indicated that he saw no reason other than anti-nuclear feeling in New Zealand, why nuclear-powered warships should not return.

That must not be allowed to happen. The price, however, of maintaining our nuclear free stance will be eternal vigilance. Legislation is always capable of being amended by a parliamentary majority. Forgive my cynicism, but I have recently witnessed New Zealand First give National a majority to deregulate our postal services and cast our kindergartens outside the state sector. Their anti-nuclear position could prove to be similarly flexible.

It is important that those dedicated to preserving the nuclear-free legislation as it is work to ensure that a majority against aspects of it is not built up in Parliament as the National Party works to weaken New Zealand First's policy

Only yesterday the Independent reported that ministers "are probably hoping there will be a repeat on defence issues of the emerging pattern whereby long-cherished and previously off- limits National Party policies get a new lease of life thanks to the coalition".

That is exactly my concern. Never forget that Don McKinnon resigned as National defence spokesperson when Mr Bolger announced National's acceptance of the nuclear-free legislation.

My second concern is that the coalition government may be about to endorse a misguided spending spree on defence.

This poses many questions, the most basic of which is: just exactly who is the enemy? Who are we to rearm ourselves against?

I come from the school of thought which says that the greatest threat to New Zealand's security for many years has been the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war which that brings.

That is why I believe New Zealand was justified in putting nuclear disarmament measures at the forefront of its agenda, even to the point where it separated us from traditional allies and defence arrangements.

The simple truth is that there will not be a replay of World War II in the Pacific, and that the need for conventional alliances like ANZUS has long since passed.

So where are the government and the defence forces seeking to lead us now?

The answer is, I fear back into an outdated alliance structure where we would spend on equipment not to meet our own needs, but rather to impress others and to ensure that our defence units could slot in as modules to larger allied arrangements for which there is no obvious purpose.

I believe this trend is both misguided and wasteful of public money. We have in this country many needs for economic and social development. A significant increase in defence expenditure would divert resources from our high priority needs.

What we need is a thorough-going defence review which takes a hard look at what New Zealand's real defence needs are. The White Paper produced by the Labour Government in the 'eighties defined those needs rather well, but then the purchase of the frigates diverted that government from the defence objectives it had set.

It is time once again to set out a clear vision for the security of New Zealand and to set all our policies within that framework.

Let me offer my vision of what the security of New Zealand must be built on:

1. Our approach to security must be comprehensive. It must bring together our foreign, defence, trade, environment, economic, and social policies. It must have both an international focus and a regional Asia-Pacific focus. It must be multilateral in its approach.

2. Nuclear disarmament must continue to be at the top of our priorities. In pursuing nuclear disarmament New Zealand must seek to be a leader, not a follower. We must be proactive.

The agenda for us to follow is clear. It is set out in the objectives of Abolition 2000, and it is set out in the substantial report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

The Canberra Commission's report lacks a recommendation on a clear timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Such a timetable will be resisted by the nuclear weapons states. It will be up to countries like ours with clean hands on these issues to work to bind in the nuclear weapons states to a timetable for negotiations to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

I do not for a moment underestimate the challenge before us. Yet I see no more important task than the negotiation of a convention to eliminate nuclear weapons.

I am greatly encouraged by the breadth of support for such a convention. The call from sixty generals and admirals from around the world in December last year for the reduction of nuclear arsenals to a low level with the aim of complete elimination in the near future was very significant. General George Lee Butler and General Andrew Goodpaster, who led the call, have held office at the highest level of the United States military. They cannot be dismissed as some kind of extreme fringe as Paul East and others would like to portray nuclear free campaigners.

Similarly, the Canberra Commission brought together significant international figures from each of the nuclear weapons states as well as from other nations. They were unanimous in their view that nuclear weapons must be eliminated.

The agenda, then, is clear. What is required is the political will to make New Zealand a strong proponent of it. My experience these last seven-and-a-half years has been that the National Government has had to be dragged into taking strong positions on disarmament issues and that many, many months of lobbying and parliamentary questioning have been required to get even cautious movement by government. The government often seems more preoccupied with what other countries will think of a New Zealand move than with the intrinsic merit of taking a particular position!

3. The other major component of our comprehensive security approach must be our efforts to form strong relations with the nations of the Asia-Pacific.

I do not dismiss the notion of conventional threats to our security from this region as unrealistic. But it is very much in New Zealand's interests to see a prosperous and stable region develop. For that reason, I see the existence and success of ASEAN as important in bringing together nations which in the not too distant past were enemies. New Zealand has '` been part of a structured dialogue with ASEAN from its very beginning. That is positive.

In recent years, ASEAN has developed a multilateral Regional Forum in which all its nations participate alongside China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Australia, the United States and Canada.

Through this forum I believe we can work to see the remaining tensions in the Asia-Pacific dissipated. There are issues over the future of North Korea, of Taiwan, and of the Spratley Islands. But I am confident that if there is a framework within which to discuss security issues, we will avert the outright conflict to which there is no satisfactory military solution.

In this regional multilateralism, I believe New Zealand's reputation for being independent minded is a real strength. Put simply, we are not presently seen as a mouthpiece for anybody else when we raise our views. It is vital that we maintain that status and not jeopardise it by making ill-advised moves back towards the narrow alliances of the past.

I believe our perceived independence also enables us to raise the hard issues like those of human rights without unproductively raising the hackles of those whose governments compromise human rights.

We cannot back away from those issues because human rights form a basic part of our own value system. But our reputation for independence and our willingness to engage in the region as a partner makes it more possible in my view for New Zealand to be heard.

The most constructive expenditure on our security in the future will be the resources we devote to diplomacy, the expansion of trade, and the development of strong people to people links with our region.

My recommendation with respect to our future defence arrangements is that we should substantially reaffirm the direction of the 1987 White Paper on defence. Our priorities are the surveillance and protection of our exclusive economic zone and the zones of those South Pacific nations with which we have close associations. We need the capacity to respond to civil emergencies at home and in the South Pacific. We should retain the capability necessary to participate in the peacekeeping missions of the United Nations.

None of that demands any significant overall increase in defence expenditure. What is needed is the reprioritising of our defence budget. The army, which does the lion's share of our peacekeeping work. has been kept short of funds, while the commitment to a four frigate, high technology, anti-submarine warfare-focused navy does little to contribute to meeting our realistic defence needs.

In summary my key messages are these:

1. The price of maintenance of our nuclear free policy is eternal vigilance. Forces in the National Party will weaken it if they can.

2. Our approach to security must be comprehensive.

3. Our priorities must be the elimination of nuclear weapons internationally and a strong Asia-Pacific regional focus in our relationship-building.

4. The principles of the 1987 Defence Review should be reaffirmed as those guiding the future of our defence forces. There are no compelling grounds for a significant increase in overall defence spending.